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The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture
Protecting Investors in Securitization Transactions:
Does Dodd–Frank Help, or Hurt?
Steven L. Schwarcz
Securitization has been called into question because of its role in
the recent financial crisis. I examine the potential flaws in the
securitization process and compare how the Dodd–Frank Act treats
them. Although Dodd–Frank addresses one of the flaws, it
underregulates or fails to regulate other flaws. It also overregulates
by addressing aspects of securitization that are not flawed.
INTRODUCTION
Securitization has been criticized because of its role in the
recent financial crisis. Securitization refers to a category of
financing transactions in which companies sell rights to payment
under mortgage loans, accounts receivable, lease rentals, and other
types of income-producing financial assets to a trust or other
special-purpose vehicle (an “SPV,” sometimes interchangeably
called a special-purpose entity or SPE). The goal is to separate
these assets from the risks generally associated with the
company—usually called the “originator” to distinguish it from the
SPV. The originator then can use these assets, held by the SPV, to
raise funds in the capital markets at a lower cost than if it had
borrowed the funds.
Securitization accomplishes this cost saving for two reasons.
First, by raising funds without having to borrow from a bank or
other financial intermediary, the originator avoids the intermediary’s
profit mark-up. This approach, called “disintermediation,” is similar
to buying wholesale (rather than retail).
Second, the interest rate payable on the securities issued by an
SPV is ordinarily lower than the interest rate payable on corporate
securities issued directly by the originator. This interest-rate
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savings reflects that financial assets are usually more
creditworthy—and almost always easier to understand and value—
than an originator itself, which has all of the business and other
risks associated with an operating company.1
Most securitization transactions follow a typical sequence of
steps. When an originator sells financial assets to an SPV, the SPV
issues securities to capital market investors. The SPV uses the cash
proceeds of the securities issuance to pay the originator the
purchase price of the financial assets. These steps are usually
deemed to occur simultaneously.
Investors in the SPV’s securities expect to ultimately be paid
from collections on the financial assets purchased by the SPV. If,
for example, those assets are residential mortgage loans, investors
will be paid from mortgage payments made by the homeowners on
those loans. Securities of an SPV that are payable from (i.e.,
backed by) collections on mortgage loans are often called
mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”). Securities of an SPV that are
payable from collections on other types of financial assets are often
called asset-backed securities (“ABS”). References to ABS and
asset-backed securities can also more broadly—and in my lecture,
will—include MBS and mortgage-backed securities.
The first recognized securitization transactions took place in
the United States in the early 1970s and involved pools of
mortgage loans originated by savings and loan associations. These
companies needed to turn their mortgage loans into cash to
continue financing local housing demands. To achieve this, the
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae)
facilitated securitizations through SPVs in the form of trusts
holding mortgage loans and issuing securities in the form of trust
certificates to investors.
Since then, securitization has become the principal means by
which banks and other mortgage lenders turn residential home
mortgage loans into cash in order to make new residential home
mortgage loans and expand home ownership in the United States.2
1. Thus, securities backed by financial assets are usually more
creditworthy than securities issued directly by the originators. STEVEN L.
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET
SECURITIZATION § 1:3 (3d ed. & Supp. 2010) (explaining that except for the
most highly rated issuers, securities issued in securitization transactions
typically are more highly rated than the issuer’s own debt securities—and that,
even where the latter are more highly rated, securitization provides additional
market flexibility to obtain financing).
2. Indeed, securitization more generally had become so important to the
American economy that the Securities and Exchange Commission observed in
1992 that it was “becoming one of the dominant means of capital formation in
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Securitization has also become an important way for companies of
all types to raise low-cost financing.
This lecture focuses on the Dodd–Frank Act’s impact on
investor protection in securitization transactions. the analysis
begins by examining securitization’s role in the recent financial
crisis. There is, however, an important perspective to keep in mind
throughout the lecture. Investors in securitization transactions are
generally large financial institutions such as banks, insurance
companies, pension funds, and hedge funds. Many of these
institutions are so large and sophisticated that they constitute
qualified institutional buyers (“QIBs”) under SEC Rule 144A,3
enabling them to freely buy securities from and sell securities to
other QIBs as if the securities were issued in a registered public
offering.4 One might question whether Dodd–Frank, or any other
legislation, should have the goal of protecting these types of
investors.5
I. SECURITIZATION’S ROLE IN THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
The securitization of subprime mortgage loans—essentially
mortgage loans made to risky borrowers—is widely viewed as a
root cause of the financial crisis. Securitization transactions were
sometimes backed, at least in part, by these types of loans. Because
home prices had generally been increasing in the United States
since the Great Depression, the expectation was that continuing
home-price appreciation would enable even risky borrowers to
repay their loans by refinancing their houses. But this model failed
when, in 2007 and 2008, home prices fell significantly.
Many argue that the “originate-to-distribute” model of
securitization, enabling mortgage lenders to sell off loans as they
are made, led to overreliance on the expectation of repayment
through home-price appreciation. According to this argument, the

the United States.” Investment Company Act Release No. 19105, [1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,062, at 83,500 (Nov. 19, 1992) (provided
in connection with the issuance of Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act
of 1940).
3. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 385 (2008) (defining
QIBs and noting they were the group that lost the most money during the recent
financial crisis).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1995).
5. My lecture does not purport to address the narrow issue of mortgagor
protection. Much has already been written on that topic, and mortgage loans are
only a subset of the financial assets involved in securitization transactions.
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originate-to-distribute model created moral hazard because lenders
did not have to live with the credit consequences of their loans.
Loan origination standards therefore fell.6
I will later discuss other possible explanations of why subprime
loans were made and securitized. Whatever the explanation, the
fall in home prices meant that subprime borrowers who were
relying on refinancing for loan repayment could not refinance.
Furthermore, many subprime mortgage loans had adjustable rates
which increased after an initial “teaser” period. Borrowers who
could not afford the rate increases had expected to refinance at
lower interest rates. That likewise was stymied by collapsing home
prices. For these reasons, risky borrowers began defaulting.
The defaults had mostly localized consequences in ordinary
securitization transactions. But, they had larger, systemic
consequences in transactions that involved complex and highly
leveraged securitizations of ABS already issued in prior
securitizations—effectively “securitizations of securitizations.”7 I
refer to these collectively as “ABS CDO” transactions.8
The distinction can be explained in a simplified manner as
follows. In ordinary securitization transactions, payment on the
ABS is derived directly from collections on the underlying
financial assets owned by the SPV. When the underlying pool of
financial assets includes mixed types of assets, such as mortgage
loans and non-mortgage loans, the securitization is sometimes
referred to as a collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) transaction.
Yet, it is still an ordinary transaction, and payment is still derived
directly from the underlying financial assets.
Problems began to arise, however, when ABS issued in
ordinary securitization transactions were themselves securitized in
the ABS CDO transactions, under which numerous classes, or
“tranches,” of securities of descending priority were sold to
investors. The resulting leverage caused relatively small errors in
cash flow projections—due to unexpectedly high default rates on
underlying subprime loans—to create defaults on substantial
amounts of low-investment-grade-rated subordinated tranches of
these securities, and to cause even AAA-rated senior tranches of
these securities to be downgraded.
Why did these transactions degenerate to the point that even
relatively small errors in cash flow projections caused defaults and
6. Arguably, the fall was exacerbated by the fact that mortgage lenders
could make money on the volume of loans originated.
7. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 220 (2009).
8. These are CDOs of ABS.
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downgradings? One explanation is that securitization’s focus on
mathematical modeling to statistically predict the payments on
financial assets underlying ABS CDO securities fostered an
overreliance on modeling and an abandonment of common sense.9
Another explanation is that investors, who seemed as anxious to
buy these securities as underwriters were to sell them, were overly
complacent.
Whatever the reasons, these defaults and downgradings
spooked investors, who believed “AAA” meant iron-clad safety
and “investment grade” meant relative freedom from default.
Investors started losing confidence in ratings and avoiding the debt
markets. Fewer investors meant that the price of debt securities
began falling. Falling prices meant that firms using debt securities
as collateral had to mark them to market and put up cash. But that
required the sale of more securities, causing market prices to
plummet further downward in a death spiral.
The U.S. Government’s refusal in mid-September 2008 to save
Lehman Brothers, and Lehman’s resulting bankruptcy, added to
this collapse. Investors lost all confidence in debt markets, and
even the short-term commercial paper market virtually shut down.
The lack of debt financing meant companies could no longer grow
and, in some cases, even survive. That affected the real economy
and, at least in part, contributed to the financial crisis.
The crisis was also arguably exacerbated by the fact that
securitization made it difficult to work out problems with the
underlying mortgage loans. The beneficial owners of the loans
were no longer the mortgage lenders, but a broad universe of
investors in the ABS. Servicers theoretically bridged the gap,
tasked with the responsibility to restructure the underlying loans
“in the best interests” of those investors. The reality, however, was
more problematic.
Servicers were reluctant to engage in restructurings when there
was uncertainty that their costs would be reimbursed. Foreclosure
costs, in contrast, were relatively minimal. Servicers also preferred
foreclosure over restructuring because foreclosure was more
ministerial and thus had lower litigation risk.10 As a result,
9. See Steve Lohr, In Modeling Risk, the Human Factor Was Left Out,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B1 (describing how the models failed to keep pace
with the complex securities); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization,
41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1323–24 (2009).
10. Restructuring can involve difficult decisions. For example, in a
mortgage securitization transaction in which cash flows deriving from principal
and interest are separately allocated to different investor classes, or tranches, a
restructuring that reduces the interest rate would adversely affect investors in the
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foreclosure was artificially favored, forcing many homeowners
from their homes and further driving down property values.
II. DODD–FRANK’S RESPONSE
The Dodd–Frank Act11 addresses securitization, by focusing,
essentially, on three issues: (i) adequacy of disclosure, (ii) conflicts
between securitizers and investors, and (iii) rating agency
information. In discussing Dodd–Frank, I will occasionally use the
Act’s term, “securitizer.” The term is somewhat imprecise,
meaning either the issuer of ABS or a person who organizes and
initiates an ABS transaction by selling or otherwise transferring
financial assets, directly or indirectly, to the issuer.12 Because
issuers of ABS are virtually always SPVs, the real securitizer
impacted by the Act would usually be either the originator itself or
an investment bank that pools financial assets into an SPV for
eventual issuance of CDO or ABS CDO securities.
(i) Adequacy of Disclosure: The Act directs the SEC to
require more standardized disclosure of information regarding the
underlying financial assets, including information on the assets
underlying each class of ABS.13 This disclosure requirement is
intended to facilitate an easier comparison of classes.14 The Act
also directs the SEC to require securitizers to engage in a duediligence review of the underlying financial assets and to disclose
to investors the nature of the review.15
(ii) Conflicts between Securitizers and Investors: The Act
attempts to limit conflicts of interest between securitizers and
investors by requiring securitizers, in transactions that are not
backed entirely by qualified residential mortgage loans,16 to retain
an unhedged economic interest in the credit risk of each class of
ABS.17 This is colloquially known as keeping “skin in the game.”

interest-only tranche (and likewise, a restructuring that reduces principal would
adversely affect investors in the principal-only tranche).
11. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 941–946, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act].
12. Id. § 941(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2010)).
13. Id. § 942(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §77g(c) (2010)).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 945 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77g(d) (2010)).
16. The SEC and other governmental agencies are directed to collectively
define what constitutes qualified residential mortgage loans, taking into account
mortgage risk factors. Id. § 941(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11
(2010)).
17. Id. § 941 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (2010)).
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The minimum retained interest is generally five percent, 18 although
it may be less if the financial assets meet quality standards to be
announced by government agencies.19
(iii) Rating Agency Information: Dodd–Frank also requires the
SEC to adopt regulations requiring rating agencies to explain, in
any report accompanying an ABS credit rating, the representations,
warranties, and other enforcement rights available to investors,
including a comparison of how these rights differ from rights in
similar transactions.20
In addition to these securitization-targeted provisions, Dodd–
Frank attempts to generally increase investor protection. For
example, it enables the SEC to impose a fiduciary standard on
broker–dealers providing personalized investment services.21 It
also provides special protections for investors who are older
individuals.22 These more general protections, however, would not
appear to be significant to investors in securitization transactions,
who are usually financial institutions that choose their investments
through internal financial analysts rather than acting through
broker–dealers or other fiduciaries.
Much of the substance of the Dodd–Frank Act will be realized
through administrative rulemaking by the SEC and other federal
government agencies.23 The Act also creates a Financial Stability
Oversight Council to examine and monitor possible sources of
systemic risk24 and to identify any regulatory gaps.25
18. When an originator retains some risk, that risk subtracts from the 5%
risk that the securitizer would otherwise have to hold.
19. These agencies are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Federal Reserve Board, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
20. Dodd–Frank Act § 943 (2010). Dodd–Frank also has provisions,
indirectly affecting securitization, aimed at increasing the reliability of credit
ratings issued by rating agencies. See, e.g., id. §§ 931–939H. Dodd–Frank also
includes provisions regulating credit rating agencies.
21. Id. § 913 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2010)).
22. Id. § 989A (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5537 (2010)).
23. Cf. Lois L. Weinroth & Richard L. Fried, Securitization Provisions of
the Dodd–Frank Act, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Fall 2010, at 38, 43 (observing that
“it is impossible to predict at this time the full range of regulations that will be
applicable to the asset-backed securitization industry”).
24. Dodd–Frank Act § 111 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2010)).
The Secretary of the Treasury chairs the Council, which has nine additional
voting members (all but one of whom is a federal agency head, including the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board). Because the Council meets only
periodically, its day-to-day operations are run through a new Office of Financial
Research within the Department of the Treasury. This office is responsible for
collecting data from regulators and market participants, issuing reports on
potential regulatory gaps, and making supervisory recommendations. Id. §§ 116,
152–154.
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III. DOES DODD–FRANK ADDRESS SECURITIZATION’S FLAWS?
I believe that Dodd–Frank inadequately addresses
securitization’s flaws. Although it addresses one of the flaws (or, at
least, alleged flaws), it underregulates or fails to regulate other
flaws. It also overregulates by addressing aspects of securitization
that are not flawed.
A. Dodd–Frank Addresses One of Securitization’s Flaws
Dodd–Frank addresses one of securitization’s flaws—or at
least one of its alleged flaws. I mentioned that the originate-todistribute model of securitization is believed to have fostered an
undisciplined mortgage lending industry, including the making of
subprime loans. The Dodd–Frank Act addresses the originate-todistribute model by requiring securitizers to retain skin in the
game, i.e., to retain some realistic risk of loss.26 The theory is that
by aligning the incentives of securitizers—meaning in this case the
originators of the loans—and investors, the lending industry will
become more disciplined.
A remaining issue is the extent to which the originate-todistribute model actually caused mortgage underwriting standards
to fall. Some argue standards fell because of U.S. governmental
pressure on banks and other mortgage lenders to make and
securitize subprime mortgage loans to expand homeownership.27
The fall in standards also may reflect distortions caused by the
liquidity glut of the time when lenders competed aggressively for
business,28 or it may have been caused by conflicts of interest
between lending firms and their employees in charge of setting
lending standards, such as employees being paid for booking loans
regardless of the loans’ long-term performance.29 Blaming the
originate-to-distribute model for lower mortgage underwriting

25. Id.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 16–19.
27. See generally Peter J. Wallison, The Lost Cause: The Failure of the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, AEI FINANCIAL SERVICES OUTLOOK
(January–February 2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2011/02/10/FSO
-2011-02-g.pdf.
28. Id. at 3–4 (noting the deterioration of mortgage underwriting standards
in the years prior to the bubble’s collapse).
29. Carlos Garriga, Lending Standards in Mortgage Market, FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECONOMIC SYNOPSES (2009), available at http://
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/09/ES0923.pdf (describing generally that
lending standards were too loose).
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standards also does not explain why standards were not similarly
lowered for originating non-mortgage financial assets used in other
types of securitization transactions. Nor does it explain why the
ultimate beneficial owners of the mortgage loans—the investors in
the ABS—did not govern their investments by the same strict
lending standards that they would observe but for the separation of
origination and ownership.
The extent to which the originate-to-distribute model actually
contributed to the financial crisis may never be known. If that
model was not a significant causal factor, Dodd–Frank’s skin-inthe-game requirement may well constitute overregulation.
Also, it is ironic that skin-in-the game can even lull investors
into a false sense of security. In the financial crisis, for example,
there is some evidence that investors purchased senior tranches of
ABS because underwriters retained the most subordinated
interests—creating what I have termed a “mutual misinformation”
problem.30
To its credit, though, Dodd–Frank mandates that the Financial
Services Oversight Council submit a report to Congress on the
macroeconomic effects of the skin-in-the-game requirements,
including possibly proactively regulating mortgage origination as
an alternative or supplement.31
B. Dodd–Frank Underregulates and Fails to Regulate other Flaws
Dodd–Frank underregulates, and in some cases fails to
regulate, other flaws of securitization. For example, Dodd–Frank
fails to meaningfully address the danger of mixing politics and
finance, as occurred before the financial crisis with the
governmental pressure to securitize subprime mortgage loans to
expand home ownership.32
Dodd–Frank also does not directly address the problem of
overreliance on mathematical modeling. Mathematical models are
not inherently problematic. To the contrary, if the model is realistic
and the inputted data are reliable, models can yield accurate
predictions of real events. However, if the model is unrealistic or
the inputted data are unreliable—as occurred when unexpectedly
high default rates due to the housing collapse undermined the value
of ABS CDO securities—it can be misleading.
Because the financial crisis has shaken faith in the market’s
ability to analyze and measure risk through models, this
30. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 241–42.
31. Dodd–Frank Act § 946 (2010).
32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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overreliance on mathematical models should, to some extent, be
self-correcting. In the long term, however, I fear that, as market
experience has often shown, investor memories will become short.
Dodd–Frank also fails to address the complacency problem.33 I
am not sure, however, that regulation is an effective method of
changing human behavior. Because there is a perceived safety in
numbers, market participants will inevitably engage in herd
behavior. And, if others are doing it, some people will continue to
invest in high-yielding securities they cannot understand. When I
was a law student, I took a seminar in legislation with the great
legislative scholar, Frank Grad. He would often observe that the
real problem is not statutory drafting per se but the fact that
statutes apply to, and are applied by, people.
Dodd–Frank also does not address the servicing problem, but I
find that less troublesome. Parties can—and should have incentive
to—write underlying deal documentation that sets clearer and more
flexible guidelines and more certain reimbursement procedures for
loan restructuring, especially when restructuring appears to be
superior to foreclosure. Parties can also minimize allocating cash
flows to investors in ways that create conflicts. Furthermore,
parties can agree, when appropriate, to subject servicers to more
realistic performance standards, perhaps akin to a business
judgment rule that allows them to restructure loans in good faith
without being exposed to liability.34
C. Dodd–Frank Overregulates by Addressing Aspects of
Securitization that are Not Flawed
Dodd–Frank overregulates by addressing some aspects of
securitization that are not flawed. I have already indicated that the
skin-in-the-game requirement might constitute overregulation.
Dodd–Frank also may overregulate in its requirements for more
standardized disclosure of information. In principle it should be
helpful for investors to get that information, including information
33. Cf. RANDALL S. KROSZNER & ROBERT J. SHILLER, REFORMING U.S.
FINANCIAL MARKETS: REFLECTIONS BEFORE AND BEYOND DODD-FRANK 16
(2009) (comparing the current complacency with that of the Great Depression
era); Scott McCleskey, The Scott McCleskey Report: Assessing Dodd–Frank:
Systemic Risk, GOVERNANCE, RISK AND COMPLIANCE: DODD FRANK WATCH, 1
(July 10, 2010), http://www.complinet.com/dodd-frank/news/analysis/article/the
-scott-mccleskey-report-assessing-dodd-frank-systemic-risk.html (noting there is
a complacency issue in the models used to assess market risk).
34. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the
Dilemma of the Indenture Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037 (2008) (arguing this
standard should apply to indenture trustee duties after default).
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about the financial assets underlying each class of ABS. In my
experience, though, prospectuses usually already provide this type
of information.35 Furthermore, although Dodd–Frank will require
securitizers to engage in a due-diligence review of the underlying
financial assets and to disclose to investors the nature of the
review, that too, in my experience, is already routinely done.
The larger problem is that investors do not always read and
understand the disclosed information.36 There are at least two
reasons for this. One reason is complacency, discussed above. The
second reason is a conflict of interest within investing firms. As
investments become more complex, conflicts of interest are
increasingly driven by short-term management compensation
schemes, especially for technically sophisticated secondary
managers.37
For example, as the VaR, or value-at-risk, model for measuring
investment-portfolio risk became more accepted, financial firms
began compensating secondary managers not only for generating
profits but also for generating profits with low risks, as measured
by VaR. Secondary managers therefore turned to investment
products with low VaR risk profiles, like credit-default swaps that
generate small gains but only rarely have losses. The managers
knew, but did not always explain to their seniors, that any losses
that might eventually occur would be huge.

35. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (1994) (noting there must be a clear
presentation of information to potential investors); JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 143–47 (2009) (discussing
disclosure requirements).
36. The Dodd–Frank Act does attempt to address other possible flaws that
have been associated with securitization: that investors in securitization
transactions may over-rely on rating-agency ratings, and that derivatives are
largely unregulated. The extent of appropriate reliance on ratings, and indeed the
integrity of the ratings process itself, are matters of concern to debt markets
generally, not merely to securitization markets. Similarly, the question of
derivatives regulation goes far beyond securitization, and, in my experience,
virtually only non-standardized derivatives—a type not the primary focus of
Dodd–Frank, which requires standardized derivatives to be traded in centralized
clearing houses—tie into securitization transactions. The Dodd–Frank Act
requires that standard derivatives be cleared through central clearinghouses.
Dodd–Frank Act § 956 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2010)). Certain
customized derivative transactions, as well as derivatives transactions by nonfinancial companies, however, are not subject to centralized clearing. Dodd–
Frank Act §§ 723, 727, 731, 763, 764, 766 (2010). I therefore will not focus on
rating agencies or derivatives.
37. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The
Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457
(2009); Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 261–62.
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This is an intra-firm conflict, quite unlike the traditional focus
of scholars and politicians on conflicts between managers and
shareholders. Dodd–Frank attempts to fix the traditional type of
conflict but completely ignores the problem of secondarymanagement conflicts.38 The regulatory response should require
that the compensation of managers of financial institutions,
including secondary managers, be based more on long-term firm
performance.
Dodd–Frank’s focus on disclosure may also be insufficient.39
Disclosure itself can never be a complete answer to complexity.40
In the foregoing context, Dodd–Frank’s mandate to the SEC—
to adopt regulations requiring rating agency reports on
securitization transactions to explain the rights available to
investors and compare those rights with rights in similar
transactions—is somewhat incongruous because it places
disclosure obligations on rating agencies. To the extent this
information is material, its inclusion should already be required in
any prospectus accompanying the sale of ABS. Requiring rating
agencies to also disclose this information is, to that extent,
overregulation.41
CONCLUSION
At the outset of this lecture, I questioned whether Dodd–Frank
or any other legislation should have the goal of protecting the
largest and most sophisticated investors. I certainly do not believe
these investors need protection as a matter of governmental
paternalism. On the other hand, their failures can cause terrible
externalities, potentially having systemic consequences to the
38. Dodd–Frank’s attempt to fix the traditional conflict might actually
backfire. Recent research by Professor Iman Anabtawi at UCLA suggests that
shareholders, even more than senior executives, want companies to take risks.
39. The other market imperfections—complacency and a type of tragedy of
the commons in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue
to individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of
the resource, whereas the costs of exploitation are distributed more widely—are
matters of concern to debt markets generally, not merely to securitization
markets, so I won’t focus on them.
40. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH. L. REV. 1109 (2008) (arguing that disclosure is a
necessary but insufficient response to complexity); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1 (2004) (same).
41. Although, I can see an argument that rating agencies are likely to have
broader industry knowledge, enabling them to more easily prepare that
disclosure.
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financial system. To that extent, protecting those investors will
protect others.
I also observed that some financial products, such as
securitization, have become so complex that disclosure can never
be a complete answer. Because of this increasing complexity,
failures are and will continue to be inevitable. Ex post regulatory
responses, such as financial market stabilizers, will therefore
become increasingly important to supplement ex ante regulatory
restrictions.42
Finally, although Dodd–Frank imperfectly addresses
securitization, we can hope that the administrative rulemaking it
delegates will eventually curtail some of the overregulation, and
that the Financial Stability Oversight Council created by DoddFrank will eventually recommend fixes for the underregulation.

42. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to
Financial Regulation: The Chapman Dialogue Series and Law Review
Symposium Keynote Address, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 257 (2011).

